Quantum Interactive Dualism: The Libet and Einstein-Podolsky-RosenCausal Anomalies by Stapp, Henry P.
LBNL-59906                                                                    To appear in Erkenntnis in 2006  
 
Quantum Interactive Dualism: The Libet and Einstein-Podolsky-
Rosen Causal Anomalies 
 
                                             Henry P. Stapp 
 
Abstract: Replacing faulty nineteenth century physics by its orthodox quantum 
successor converts the earlier materialist conception of nature to a structure that does 
not enforce the principle of the causal closure of the physical. The quantum laws 
possess causal gaps, and these gaps are filled in actual scientific practice by inputs 
from our streams of consciousness. The form of the quantum laws permits and 
suggests the existence of an underlying reality that is built not on substances, but on 
psychophysical events, and on objective tendencies for these events to occur. These 
events constitute intrinsic mind-brain connections. They are fundamental links 
between brain processes described in physical terms and events in our streams of 
consciousness. This quantum ontology confers upon our conscious intentions the 
causal efficacy assigned to them in actual scientific practice, and creates a substance-
free interactive dualism. This putative quantum ontology has previously been shown 
to have impressive explanatory power in both psychology and neuroscience.  Here it 
is used to reconcile the existence of physically efficacious conscious free will with 
causal anomalies of both the Libet and Einstein-Rosen-Podolsky types. 
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1. Introduction 
 
We all feel that certain of our conscious thoughts can cause our voluntary bodily 
actions to occur. Our lives, our institutions, and our moral codes are largely based on 
that intuition. The whole notion of “cause” probably originates in that deep-seated 
feeling.  
 
The strongest argument against this basic intuition---that our thoughts cause our 
voluntary bodily actions---stems from an experiment performed by Benjamin Libet 
(1985, 2003). In this experiment a subject is instructed to perform, voluntarily, during 
a certain time interval, a simple physical action, such as raising a finger. Libet found 
that a measurable precursor of the physical action, known as the “readiness potential”, 
occurs in the brain about one-third of a second prior to the occurrence of the 
psychologically described act of willing that action to occur.  
 
This empirical result appears to show, on the face of it, that the conscious act of 
willing must be a consequence of this associated brain activity, not the cause of it, for, 
according to the normal idea of cause, nothing can cause a prior happening to occur.  
 
This example is just one instance of a general feature of mind-brain phenomena, 
namely the fact that conscious experiences always seem to occur after a lot of 
preparatory work has already been done by the brain. This feature accords with the 
classical-physics precept of the causal closure of the physical, and it leads plausibly to 
the conclusion that the felt causal efficacy of our conscious thoughts is an illusion. 
 
One of the most intensely studied aspects of quantum mechanics is the occurrence of 
correlations in which a “voluntary” choice made at one time appears to affect events 
that occurred earlier than this choice, or simultaneously with it yet faraway. These 
correlations were the basis of a famous paper published in 1935 by Albert Einstein 
and two younger colleagues, Boris Podolsky and Nathan Rosen. The existence of 
certain puzzles associated with these correlations is called the EPR paradox. These 
correlations are correctly predicted by quantum mechanics, but they cannot be 
comprehended within the conception of the physical world postulated by classical 
mechanics. 
 
In both the Libet and EPR cases the existence of these apparent causal anomalies 
suggests that what seems to us to be “voluntary” free choices are actually 
mechanically determined by the physically described aspects of nature, in keeping 
with the precepts of classical physics. However, the founders of quantum theory were 
driven, in their search for a rationally coherent understanding of various twentieth 
century data, to a theory that consistently treats our voluntary choices as “free 
choices”. They are free in the sense that they are not determined by any currently 
known laws, even though they have, according to the laws of quantum mechanics, 
specified physical consequences, This article describes how orthodox quantum 
mechanics reconciles this idea of physically effective voluntary “free choices” with 
the Libet and EPR data 
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2. From Classical Mechanics to Orthodox Quantum Mechanics 
 
During the seventeenth century Isaac Newton created the foundations for what 
developed during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries into what is now called 
classical physics, or classical mechanics. Classical mechanics conceives the physical 
world to be composed of classically conceived particles and classically conceived 
fields. Classically conceived particles are like miniature planets that move though 
space under the influence of fields of force generated by the other particles. This 
entire physical structure develops in time in a way fixed by mechanical laws that 
entail the causal closure of the physical: the whole physically described structure is 
determined for all time by these mechanical laws---which refer only to these 
physically described elements themselves---together with initial conditions on these 
physically described parts. 
 
Around the beginning of the twentieth century it was discovered that this classical-
mechanical conception of the physical world was incompatible with the behaviors of 
large (visible) systems whose activities depended sensitively upon the behaviors of 
their atomic constituents. The classical conception of physical reality was therefore 
abandoned by physicists, at the fundamental level, and was replaced by a vastly 
different conceptual arrangement.  
 
The logical basis of this conceptual change is a curious mathematical change. To pass 
from a classically conceived physical system to its quantum generalization the 
numbers that described the classically conceived physical properties are replaced by 
mathematical actions, called operators.   
 
A principal difference between numbers and mathematical actions/operators is that 
the order in which one multiplies numbers does not matter---2 times 3 is equal to 3 
times 2---but the order in which one applies actions does matter: for two actions A 
and B, the action of A followed by the action of B, which, for historical reasons, 
physicists represent as BA is not equal, in general, to AB. 
 
The paradigmatic example is this.  
 
An important number in classical physics is the number x that represents how far 
some object has been displaced, in some direction, from an initial point x=0. An 
equally important number is the number p that represents the momentum p = mv of 
the object, where m is the mass of the object, and v is its velocity in the direction 
associated with x. In classical physics x and p are numbers, and hence xp – px = 0, but 
in the quantum counterpart of the classical system xp-px= iħ, where ħ is a number 
discovered and measured by Max Planck in 1900, and i is a number that multiplied by 
itself gives minus one.  
 
This difference between classical mechanics and quantum mechanics might seem to 
be a mere mathematical technicality, having no deep conceptual import. Indeed, the 
smallness on the scale of human activities of the effective difference between 
numbers and the corresponding mathematical actions, might naturally lead one to 
expect that the conceptual changes needed to cope with this mathematical change 
would be unimportant at the level of human beings and their actions. But this is 
apparently not the case. The founders of quantum theory, in order to secure a 
 
 
3
rationally coherent and consistent way of dealing, in a scientifically satisfactory 
manner, with the technical problems introduced by the replacement of numbers by 
actions were forced to formulate their theory in terms of actions, and in particular the 
actions of human investigators. Specifically, their theory is formulated in terms of 
predictions about the observable responses to actions that are chosen by human 
agents, with the intent to probe certain properties of systems described in the 
mathematical language of quantum mechanics. But this means that the basic physical 
theory deals no longer with intrinsic properties of physically described systems, but, 
fundamentally, with the interplay between observed and observing systems. And these 
observing systems are, paradigmatically, conscious human participants. Here the word 
“conscious” highlights the fact that the theory involves, basically, not solely the 
physical language of the quantum mathematics, but, equally importantly, also the 
concepts and language that we human beings use to communicate to our colleagues 
“what we have done and we have learned”. Moreover, the theory involves, in a 
fundamental way, also the so-called “free choices on the part of the experimenter”, 
which are experienced by experimenters as conscious choices. 
  
Any physical theory, to be relevant to our lives, must link certain mathematical 
features of the theory to the streams of consciousness of human beings. Quantum 
theory is built squarely upon the recognition of this fact 
 
To see how this works, consider the mathematical action x discussed above. As 
already mentioned, this mathematical action x replaces the number x that in classical 
mechanics specifies where (along a straight line) the (center of an) object is located. 
The postulated correspondence between the quantum mathematics and experienced 
perceptions ties the mathematical action x to the empirical probing action that would 
yield, as its perceived outcome, the number x that would specify the location of the 
object being probed, insofar as that object has a well defined location. Similarly, the 
mathematical action p is tied to a physical probing action that would yield as its 
perceived outcome the number p that specifies the momentum of the observed object, 
insofar as that momentum is well defined.  
 
Not every possible mathematical action has a perceptual counterpart. But the basic 
interpretive assumption in orthodox contemporary physics is that every possible 
probing action with a perceivable outcome has, in the quantum mathematics, an action 
counterpart: an associated operator. Thus an intrinsic mind-matter connection is built 
directly into the fabric of our basic physical theory.   
 
This profound difference between contemporary physical theory and the classical 
physical theories of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries would appear, prima facie, 
to be relevant to issues pertaining to the relationship between mind and matter. The 
earlier theories are approximations to the newer theory, and these approximations 
systematically exorcize, in a rationally coherent but physically inaccurate way, 
dynamical connections between mind and matter that the newer theory incorporates. 
 
The connection between mind and matter occurring in the original pragmatic 
formulation of quantum mechanics, which is known as the Copenhagen interpretation, 
was converted to a connection between mind and brain by an elaboration upon the 
Copenhagen interpretation developed by the renowned logician and mathematician 
John von Neumann. This developed form was named “the orthodox interpretation” by 
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von Neumann’s close colleague Eugene Wigner, and it is the starting point of most, if 
not all, investigations into the nature of the reality that lies behind the pragmatically 
successful rules of quantum mechanics.  
 
In spite of this seemingly relevant twentieth century development in physics, 
contemporary neuroscience and philosophy of mind continue to base their quests to 
understand consciousness on an essentially nineteenth century conceptualization of 
the human brain, ignoring the facts that the older conception of reality has been 
known to be false for almost a century, and that, in stark contrast to the nineteenth 
century conceptualization, contemporary orthodox physics has specified dynamical 
connections between brains and minds built intrinsically into it.   
 
 
Planck’s constant is a very tiny number on the scale of human activities. 
Consequently, the replacement of a classical system by its quantum counterpart turns 
out to be unimportant for predictions pertaining to the observable properties of 
physical systems whose behaviors are insensitive to the behaviors of their atomic-
sized constituents.  But the behaviors of brains are understood in terms the behaviors 
of the ions flowing into and out of neurons. So it is not clear, a priori, that the 
behavior of a conscious brain will, in every case, be essentially non-dependent upon 
how its atomic-sized constituents behave. Indeed, quantum calculations (Stapp, 
2004a) pertaining to the release of neurotransmitter molecules into the synaptic clefts 
separating communicating neurons show that quantum effects are important in 
principle. According to the principles of contemporary physics the behavior of a 
living brain must in principle be treated as a quantum mechanical system, with 
classical concepts applied only when justified by special circumstances. 
 
No computations have ever shown that a conscious human brain can be validly treated 
in the classical approximation. On the other hand, the three-century-old effort to 
understand the connection between mind and brain within the conceptual framework 
of materialist classical physics has led to profound conceptual difficulties. These 
difficulties have provided fertile ground for philosophical disputes that have enlivened 
the fields of philosophy of mind and neurophilosophy without producing much 
consensus. But one point of near unanimity is the conclusion that materialism is 
surely the adequate and appropriate theoretical foundation: for the scientific study of 
consciousness: that the injection by twentieth century physics of the effects of 
conscious choices made by observer-participants into the basic dynamics of physical 
systems can safely be ignored.  Still, however, a rationally coherent conceptualization 
that has specified mind-brain dynamical connections---that arise from the basic 
precepts of empirically valid physics---could conceivably provide a more adequate 
foundation for the scientific study of the behavior of actually existing mind-brain 
systems than a nineteenth century approximation that is inadequate in principle for 
systems whose behaviors depend significantly upon the dynamics of their atomic 
constituents, and that systematically exorcises the quantum-physics-mandated 
dynamical effects of conscious choices made by conscious agents. 
 
Over the past few years, I have been engaged in an effort to introduce into the 
scientific studies of consciousness certain basic results pertaining to the dynamics of 
the mind-brain system that are entailed by orthodox contemporary physics. Numerous 
application have been made in the domains of psychology, psychiatry, and 
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neuroscience. (Stapp, 2004a, 2005, 2006a-d); Schwartz, Stapp, and Beauregard, 2005) 
I shall give here first a brief summary of some of the key elements of this quantum 
approach, and then use the theory to give a unified treatment of the Libet and the 
Einstein-Rosen-Podolsky data. 
 
Classical physics is nominally about the internal properties of physical systems, but is 
known to be fundamentally false. It has been replaced by quantum physics, which is 
about the interplay between observed systems, described in terms of mathematical 
quantities attached to space-time points (~ res extensa), and observing systems, 
described in terms of elements of streams of consciousness (~ res cogitans).  
  
Although the various effects of a probing action made by a probing system upon a 
probed system are specified by quantum theory, the cause of the probing action is not 
specified by the theory. There is, therefore, a causal gap! The quantum-theoretic laws 
determine neither when a probing action will occur, nor which aspects of the observed 
system will be probed. Niels Bohr emphasizes this key feature of quantum mechanics 
when he says: 
 
"The freedom of experimentation, presupposed in classical physics, is of 
course retained and corresponds to the free choice of experimental 
arrangement for which the mathematical structure of the quantum mechanical 
formalism offers the appropriate latitude." (Bohr, 1958, p.73) 
 
 “To my mind there is no other alternative than to admit in this field of 
experience, we are dealing with individual phenomena and that our 
possibilities of handling the measuring instruments allow us only to make a 
choice between the different complementary types of phenomena that we want 
to study. (Bohr, 1958, p. 51)   
 
In practical applications, in both classical and quantum mechanics, physicists treat the 
human experimenter as an agent who sets up experiments on the basis of his reasons. 
In neither classical nor quantum theory does anyone actually use the dynamical 
equations to determine what a real experimenter will actually do. The brain is too 
complex and too inaccessible to non-disturbing observations at the needed level of 
accuracy to permit this. In classical physics there is the presumption that the physical 
laws determine in principle what an experimenter will do. But this presumption goes 
far beyond what has been scientifically tested and confirmed. In the more accurate 
contemporary orthodox quantum theory the conclusion is just the opposite: in 
principle the known laws definitely do not determine how the experimenter will act, or 
even place statistical conditions on these choices. To fill this lacuna the founders of 
quantum mechanics brought into the theory certain inputs from conscious human 
beings, namely their choices of their own actions. This introduction of physically 
efficacious conscious choices into the physical theory in a fundamental way was the 
most radical of the breaks with precedent introduced by the founders of quantum 
theory, and is the one most vigorously opposed by physicists seeking a closer-to-
tradition alternative to the Copenhagen and orthodox (von Neumann) approaches. 
However, none of the proposed alternatives appears to be satisfactory, as yet, even to 
its supporters.  (See Appendix A of Schwartz, et al., and the references cited there, 
most particularly Stapp 2002, and also Stapp 2006a-d) 
 
 
 
6
Specifically, quantum theory brings into the causal description, in addition to the 
(sometimes-violated) deterministic continuous evolution in accordance with the 
quantum generalization of the deterministic classical process of evolution, also 
choices of two kinds, both of which are implemented, or represented, by abrupt 
“quantum jumps” in the continuous deterministic evolution. One of the two kinds of 
choices determines the familiar collapse of the wave function (or reduction of the 
wave packet). It is called by Dirac a “choice on the part of nature”, and it is a choice--
-from among the several alternative possible outcomes of a probing action performed 
upon an observed/probed system---of one particular outcome. These choices “on the 
part of nature” are “random”: they are asserted by the theory to conform to certain 
statistical conditions. These “choices on the part of nature” are precisely where the 
randomness enters (irreducibly) into contemporary physics.  
 
But, according to the orthodox precepts, this statistically governed “choice on the part 
of nature” must be preceded by another choice: a choice of which (probing) 
experiment is to be performed, and when it will be performed. No known laws 
constrain this choice of the probing action, and it is consistently treated in orthodox 
quantum theory as “a free choice on the part of the experimenter” This “choice on the 
part of the experimenter” fixes the form of the physically/mathematically described 
probing action. The representation within the quantum mathematics of this probing 
action is called by von Neumann “Process 1”.  
 
The logical need for this choice, which is not specified by any known law, persists, 
even when the quantum-mathematically described part of the universe---which in the 
original Copenhagen interpretation does not include either the body or the brain of the 
observer, or even his or her measuring devices---is expanded (by von Neumann) to 
include the entire physical universe, including the bodies and brains of the observers. 
The essential point is that the inclusion of the body and brain of the human 
agent/participant into the quantum-mechanically described universe still leaves 
undetermined the choices made by that human person  
 
This logically needed choice is relegated, in von Neumann’s words, to the 
experimenter’s “abstract ego”. But no matter what words are used, the fact remains 
that the inclusion of the body and brain of the observer into the physically described 
quantum world leaves undetermined the logically needed choice of which physical 
Process1 probing action actually occurs. No known law, statistical or otherwise, 
specifies which probing action, Process 1 action, actually occurs.  
 
The choosing process, whatever it is, that specifies this choice of the actually 
occurring Process 1 is called Process 4. Process 2, so-named by von Neumann, is the 
continuous deterministic evolution via the Schroedinger equation, whereas Process 3 
is the choice on the part of nature of which outcome/feedback from the probing action 
actually occurs, Process 2 reigns only during the intervals between the various abrupt 
Process 1 and Process 3 quantum jumps.  
 
This need for the occurrence of physically efficacious Process 4 choices that are not 
determined by any known law, statistical or otherwise, constitutes a prima facie 
breakdown, within orthodox quantum mechanics, of the doctrine of the causal closure 
of the physical. Quantum theory, as it is taught to physicists in their university 
courses, is presented as a set of rules that allow scientists to form expectations about 
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the feedbacks they will receive by performing any one of many possible probing 
actions, between which they are free to choose. This practical format is the basis of 
the conceptual structure of quantum theory. 
 
To prepare the way for the analysis to follow I need to spell out in slightly more detail 
the structure compactly summarized above.  
 
The conversion of the classically conceived universe to its quantum generalization---
obtained by replacing numbers by actions---is called quantization. It converts the 
classical deterministic equation of motion into its quantum counterpart, called 
“Process 2” by Von Neumann.  Like its classical counterpart, this quantum law of 
evolution is deterministic: left alone, it would determine the quantum state of the 
universe for all times from its primordial form. The relativistic (quantum field 
theoretic) form of this law is moreover local: the changes in the quantum state 
associated with any region are determined by the properties associated with very 
nearby regions, and no influence propagates faster than the speed of light. 
 
This Process 2 evolution, by itself, is dynamically insufficient. Given some initial 
conditions it produces at a later time not the mathematical counterpart of one single 
perceptual probing action, but rather the counterparts of a continuous smear of 
alternative possible probing actions. Orthodox quantum theory resolves this difficulty 
by supplementing the Process 2 evolution by certain abrupt changes, which von 
Neumann calls “Process 1 interventions”. Each such mathematical intervention is tied 
by the quantum laws to a particular perceivable probing action performed upon the 
observed system by an observing system external to it.  
 
Neither the property of the observed system that is probed by this intervention, nor the 
time when this probing action occurs, is fixed by the mechanical Process 2. These two 
features are considered to be fixed by the observing system. This assignment of 
responsibility, or of causal origin, accords with the fact that in actual scientific 
practice it is the human experimenter that selects, by conscious choice, which 
particular probing action will be performed upon the system he or she is observing, 
and when that probing action will be performed. Of course, an agent’s conscious 
choices are not independent of what is going on in his brain, but orthodox 
contemporary physics does not determine how the psychic and physical components 
of reality combine to cause the Process 1 events to be what they turn out to be.  
 
The effect of the Process 1 intervention upon the observed system is specified by the 
quantum laws. This intervention selects from the smear of possible probing actions 
some particular one. The effect of this singled-out probing action upon the 
mathematically described state of the observed system is this:  it separates this state 
into a set of disjoint (i.e., non-overlapping) components in a way such that: (1), the 
statistical weights assigned by the theory to these individual components adds to 
unity; and (2), each component corresponds to a phenomenologically distinct outcome 
of that probing action.   
 
After this Process 1 separation has been made, nature picks out, and saves, one of the 
possible psychophysical outcomes of the chosen probing action, and eradicates the 
rest. Nature’s selection of outcomes---called Process 3 in my terminology---is 
asserted by the theory to respect the statistical weights assigned to the alternative 
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possible outcomes. The quantum mathematical structure becomes tied in this way to 
phenomenology, and the theory generates practical rules that allow statistical 
predictions pertaining to experiences to be deduced from the postulated mathematical 
structure. 
 
This injection of human volitional choices into the physical dynamics at a basic level 
is completely contrary to the precepts of classical physics. But this change 
accommodates the fact that we human beings do in fact inject our conscious intentions 
into the physically described world whenever we act intentionally. Accepting 
quantum mechanics opens the door to the possibility of a more detailed, and more 
useful, putative understanding of this effect of conscious intent than classical 
mechanics can provide. 
 
3. The Libet Causal Anomalies 
 
In the Libet experiment the initial intentional act is to choose willfully to perform, at 
some future time within, say within the next minute, the act of raising a finger. We 
often make such resolves to act in some specified way at some future time, and these 
commitments are often met with great precision. However, in the Libet case the 
resolve is rather imprecise as regards the exact time of the specified action. It is 
doubtful that any person, informed even by a multitude of probing devices about the 
state of the subject’s brain at the beginning of the specified interval, could predict 
with good accuracy just when the choice to move the finger will occur. And even if 
every neurophysiological-level feature of the brain were given at the outset, it is still 
questionable whether, even in a world that obeyed the deterministic laws of classical 
physics, this macroscopic data would fix the time at which the conscious choice 
occurs. There is just too much latitude for initially small-scale variations to develop 
over the course of time into significant macroscopic effects. Even within deterministic 
classical physics the best one could do with actual macroscopic data would be to 
make a statistical model based on that data and the known general properties of the 
brain.  
 
In the case of the dynamics of a warm wet living human brain, interacting with its 
environment, almost all quantum interference effects connecting appreciably different 
locations will (almost certainly) be washed out, and the quantum model will become 
similar to a classical statistical model that features a collection of parallel classically 
conceived worlds, each with some statistical weight. However, in the classical case 
one can imagine that exactly one of the statistically weighted alternative classically 
conceived possibilities is the “real” one, and that the statistical smearing represents a 
mere lack of knowledge as to which of the weighted possibilities represents the 
“actual real world”.  
 
This “lack of knowledge” interpretation cannot be carried over to quantum theory. 
However, to a good approximation, the various weighted classically conceived worlds 
of classical statistical theory can be understood to represent simultaneously existing 
potentialities, some subset of which will eventually be selected by some Process 1 
probing event. This Process 1 action will be followed by a Process 3 choice (on the 
part of nature) that specifies which of the alternative possible outcomes of the chosen 
probing action actually occurs. All potentialities that do not lead to the outcome that 
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actually occurs are eradicated by these collapse or reduction events, leaving only 
those that lead to the psychophysical event that actually does occur.  
 
In the Libet experiment, the mind-brain “set” fixed by the initial conscious intention 
to raise the finger within the next minute should cause the quantum mechanically 
described brain to generate classically describable potentialities corresponding to the 
various alternative times at which the specified conscious act could occur. Thus the 
following scenario is compatible with quantum mechanics, and is suggested by it.  
 
The initial intent (to raise the finger within the next minute) will lead to the 
production of a collection of parallel potentialities, each corresponding to a possible 
time at which the readiness potential can start its build up. Shortly after some of the 
classically described potentialities have developed to the point of specifying a certain 
possible perceivable probing action the question will pop into the stream of 
consciousness: “Shall I perform this action?” If the answer is ‘No’, as it is likely to be 
right at the beginning, then the potentialities leading up to the performance of that 
action at that time will be eradicated. A short time later a similar Process 1 question 
will be posed. The outcome is again likely to be ‘No’, and the batch of potentialities 
leading to the ‘Yes’ option will again be erased. Eventually, in accordance with the 
statistical rules, a ‘Yes’ outcome will be selected by nature, and the set of 
potentialities leading to the ‘No’ outcome will be wiped out. Only the (essentially 
classically described) potentialities leading to this ‘Yes’ outcome will remain. 
 
The “Yes” event is a psychophysical event that is felt or experienced as the feeling or 
knowledge “I shall now raise my finger”, and it is represented in the physically 
described world as the actualization, at that moment, of the neurological activity that 
constitutes the template for the action of raising the finger. (This template is a 
neural/brain activity that, if held in place for a sufficiently long interval, will tend to 
cause the finger to rise.) All brain activities---which have the ontological character of 
potentialities---that are incompatible with this intent are eliminated by this event from 
the quantum mechanical state of the brain. Hence they are eliminated from the 
statistical mixture of classically described states that approximately represents this 
quantum state.  
 
Now suppose there is in place some measuring device that can, in the approximately 
correct classical description of what is (possibly) going on, detect the time at which 
the readiness potential starts its build up. This time of the inception of the build up is 
long (one-third of a second) before the psychophysical event that will, only later, 
actualize this particular classically described world. Now suppose, furthermore, that 
the classically described measuring device activates a classically described timer that 
records the time of the beginning of the build up of the readiness potential. This 
classically described record of the time of the start of the build up of the readiness 
potential will continue to exist along side the increasing readiness potential. When 
some person, at some later time, after the occurrence of the psychophysical event that 
determines which of the classically described worlds survives---and hence that 
determines also the time at which the build-up of the readiness potential began---reads 
the timer he will find out that the start of the build up of the readiness potential 
occurred before the occurrence of the psychophysical event that selected the classical 
world that specifies the time when that build up began.   
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The key point here is that the record of the time of the start of the build up of the 
readiness potential is a causal off shoot of this build up, and this record will be 
actualized along with the actualization of the potentiality represented (to a good 
approximation) by the classically described process that the actualization event 
selects. Thus the recorded time of the beginning of the build up of the readiness 
potential will be earlier than the time of the event that actually determined (according 
to this quantum ontology) the time of the beginning of this build up: the recorded time 
of the beginning of the build up will be fixed by an event that occurs only later. 
 
Such seeming causal anomalies have been a prime point of attack on orthodox 
quantum theory, and they continue to fascinate physicists even today, under the names 
“quantum nonlocality”, or “Bell’s theorem”, or “EPR paradox.” Although this 
quantum ontological way of understanding the quantum correlation tends to upset 
people accustomed to thinking about the world in classical mechanical terms, no 
logical inconsistency or conflict with empirical data has ever been established. One 
can be quite confident in accepting that all of the known empirical evidence is 
compatible with this non-classical but logically consistent “quantum ontological” 
conception of how the world works.  
 
On the other hand, one can certainly adhere, alternatively, to the pragmatic point of 
view, which holds that, even though this quantum ontology accords with all of the 
empirically verified relationships between human experiences, and seems to provide a 
coherent putative “understanding” of what is going on, this success by no means 
implies that this understanding is veridical. For one can express the empirical 
predictions in compact ways that avoid any commitment concerning what is “really 
happening”. Thus many---and probably most---quantum physicists hold that, as 
scientists, the pragmatic option is all they need to commit to. On the other hand, for 
those who seek something more than merely “a set of rules that work” the quantum 
ontological model is a viable (i.e., not yet disproven) and logically coherent 
conception of the way that Nature actually works. The same cannot be said of local 
deterministic materialism. 
 
Human agents play a very special role in this quantum ontology. This feature is a 
hold-over from the pragmatic stance of the original Copenhagen formulation of the 
theory, which was concerned principally with establishing a rationally coherent basis 
for practical applications. However, von Neumann’s analysis shows that there is no 
empirical evidence that every occurring collapse event is associated with an event in a 
human stream of consciousness. It is certainly more plausible, from a scientific 
perspective, to assume that there are similar events associated with other biological 
organisms, and there is no empirical evidence that confutes that position. Indeed, von 
Neumann’s analysis reveals, more generally, that collapse events that act 
macroscopically on physical systems that are interacting strongly with their 
environments would be virtually impossible to detect. There is presently no evidence 
that rules out the possibility that enormous numbers of macroscopic collapse events 
are occurring all the time in large systems that are strongly connected to their 
environments. Hence the special role originally assigned to human beings is no part of 
the general quantum ontological model being described here.  
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The main cause of reservations about the actual truth of this quantum ontology is that 
it entails faster-than-light transfer of information. These faster-than-light issues are 
essentially those that arise in the much-discussed EPR paradox. 
 
4. The Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen Causal Anomalies 
 
Albert Einstein, Boris Podolsky and Nathan Rosen, published in 1935 what is perhaps 
the most discussed scientific paper of the twentieth century. Entitled “Can quantum 
mechanical description of physical reality be considered complete?” the paper argues 
that Copenhagen quantum theory does not give a complete description of physical 
reality. The argument depends on a specific way of identifying what is meant by 
“physical reality”. This identification depends on an assumption about the absence of 
influences that act backward in time or faster than the speed of light. Niels Bohr 
(1935) wrote a rebuttal that essentially admitted that the strong notion of no-faster-
than-light influence used in classical-physics does indeed fail in quantum theory, but 
claimed that an adequate replacement holds within the epistemological framework of 
quantum mechanics.  
 
The Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen argument is based on an examination of the predictions 
of quantum theory pertaining to certain correlations between macroscopic observable 
events that occur at essentially the same time in laboratories that lie far apart 
 
A simple classical example of a correlation between events occurring at essentially 
the same time in far-apart laboratories is this. Suppose one has a pair of balls, one red, 
the other green. Suppose one loads them into two rifles, and fires them in opposite 
directions into two far-apart laboratories, in which the balls will be caught and 
examined at essentially the same time. The colors found in the two regions will 
obviously be correlated: if red is found in one lab then green will be found in the 
other, and vice versa. There is nothing strange or peculiar about a correlation of this 
kind.  
  
The simplest quantum example is similar, and is again not in itself a problem. We can 
set up a certain experimental arrangement of the macroscopic preparing and 
measuring devices that will produce a situation analogous to the one with the two 
colored balls. Quantum mechanics predicts, and empirical evidence confirms, that, 
under these macroscopically specified experimental conditions, if a red light flashes 
on the detector in one laboratory, then a green light will flash at essentially the same 
time on the detector in the other laboratory, and vice versa. 
 
Einstein and his colleagues (henceforth EPR) considered a slightly more complex 
situation in which there are two alternative possible settings of the measuring device 
in the first lab and two alternative possible settings of the device in the second lab. If 
the first setting is chosen in both labs then, as before, green in either lab entails red in 
the other, and vice versa. Moreover, if the second setting is chosen in both labs then, 
as before, green in either lab entails red in the other, and vice versa 
 
A basic feature of quantum theory is this: the theory is mathematically incompatible 
with the idea that there exists both a property P1 that fixes which outcome will occur 
if the measurement in, say, the second lab specified by the first possible setting of the 
device in that (second) lab is performed, and also, simultaneously, a property P2 that 
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fixes which outcome will occur if the measurement in the second lab specified by the 
second possible setting of the device in that (second) lab is performed. Quantum 
theory regards two such properties, P1 and P2, as complementary properties that 
cannot both exist simultaneously.  
 
EPR devised an argument that seemed to show that these two properties P1 and P2 do 
exist simultaneously. Their argument produced consternation in Copenhagen. Bohr’s 
close colleague, Leon Rosenfeld (1967) described the situation as follows: 
 
This onslaught came down upon us like a bolt from the blue. Its effect on Bohr 
was remarkable. We were then in the midst of groping attempts at exploring 
… [another problem] …. A new worry could not come at a less propitious 
time. Yet as soon as Bohr had heard my report of Einstein’s argument, 
everything else was abandoned: we had to clear up such a misunderstanding at 
once. We should reply by taking up the same example and showing the right 
way to speak about it. Bohr immediately started dictating to me the outline of 
such a reply. Very soon, however, he became hesitant: “No, this will not do, 
we must try all over again … we must make it quite clear…” So it went on for 
a while with growing wonder at the unexpected subtlety of the argument. … 
Eventually he broke off with the familiar remark that he “must sleep on it.” 
The next morning he at once took up the dictation again, … the real work now 
began in earnest: day after day, week after week, the whole argument was 
patiently scrutinized … . 
 
What is the argument that set off this huge commotion, which reverberates even to 
this day? 
 
Einstein and his colleagues introduced the following “criterion of physical reality”: 
 
If, without in any way disturbing a system, we can predict with certainty (i.e., 
with probability equal to unity) a physical property of a system then there 
exists an element of physical reality corresponding to that property. 
 
This criterion seems completely reasonable, and completely in line with the 
Copenhagen philosophy, which is built upon the idea of predictions of properties of 
systems as revealed by the observed outcomes of experiments performed upon those 
systems. 
 
In the experimental situation just mentioned the setting of each device can be chosen 
and fixed just before the outcome at that device appears. The distance between the 
two labs can then be made so large that there is no time (according to the claim of the 
theory of relativity that nothing can travel faster than the speed of light) for a choice 
of setting in either lab to have any effect at all on the faraway outcome, red or green.  
 
However, the experimenter in the first lab can predict with certainty the property P1 
that is measured by using the first setting in the (faraway) second lab. He can do this 
simply by choosing the first setting in his own (first) lab and observing the outcome, 
red or green, and then inferring that P1 must be, respectively, green or red. The 
assumed---by EPR---impossibility of any faster-than-light or backward-in-time 
influence entails that this action and act of observation in the first lab cannot disturb 
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in any way this property P1 measurable in the second lab. Thus, according to the EPR 
criterion, there is an element of physical reality P1 corresponding to the property that 
is measured in the second lab when one uses there the first setting. 
 
By choosing the second setting in the first lab one finds that a property P2 
corresponding to the second setting in the second lab is, likewise, an element of 
physical reality. But---for inescapable mathematical reasons---quantum theory cannot 
accommodate the simultaneous existence of these two elements, P1 and P2, of 
physical reality. Hence, as a description of physical reality, quantum theory must, 
according to EPR, be incomplete 
 
EPR finish off their argument with the following crucial remark: 
  
One could object to this conclusion on the grounds that our criterion or       
reality is not sufficiently restrictive. Indeed, one would not arrive at our 
conclusion if one insisted that two or more physical quantities can be regarded 
as simultaneous elements of reality only when they can be simultaneously 
measured or predicted. On this point of view, since either one or the other, but 
not both simultaneously of the quantities P and Q can be predicted they are not 
simultaneously real. This makes the reality of P and Q depend upon the 
process of measurement carried out on the first system, which does not disturb 
the second system in any way. No reasonable definition of reality could be 
expected to permit this.  
 
[ EPR’s  P and Q are essentially equivalent to our P1 and P2] 
 
Bohr accepts that the orthodox principles of quantum theory demand that P and Q 
cannot, within that theory, both be assigned well defined values. How does he 
reconcile this fact with the EPR argument that both are elements or physical reality? 
 
The essence of Bohr’s reply (Bohr, 1935) is the following passage: 
 
 From our point of view we now see that the wording of the above-mentioned 
criterion of physical reality proposed by Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen 
contains an ambiguity as regards the meaning of the expression “without in 
any way disturbing the system.” Of course there is in a case like that just 
considered no question of a mechanical disturbance of the system under 
investigation during the last critical stage of the measuring procedure. But 
even at this stage there is essentially the question of an influence on the very 
conditions which describe the possible types of predictions regarding the 
future behaviour of the system. (Bohr’s italics.) Since these conditions 
constitute an inherent element of any phenomenon to which the term “physical 
reality” can be properly attached, we see that the argumentation of the above-
named authors does not justify their conclusion that quantum-mechanical 
description is essentially incomplete.  
 
If Bohr’s argument strikes you as obscure, then you are not alone. Many philosophers 
and physicists have judged Bohr’s reply to be insufficient, and have concluded that 
Einstein won the debate. Bohr himself says, in his contribution to the Einstein volume 
(Einstein, 1951, p. 234), “Reading these passages, I am deeply aware of the 
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inefficiency of expression which must have made it very difficult to appreciate the 
trend of the argumentation….”  
 
That is an accurate statement. Yet his later arguments do not seem to help. 
  
One feature of Bohr’s answer does come across clearly: his reply rejects, at some 
level, Einstein’s idea of “without in any way disturbing the system”: Bohr rejects, at 
some level, Einstein’s assumption that the freely chosen measurement process 
performed in the nearby lab does not disturb in any way the system in the faraway lab, 
even though any such disturbance would have to act essentially instantaneously. That 
is, in order to rationally counter the Einstein argument Bohr found himself forced to 
reject Einstein’s principle that all causal actions act only forward in time, and no 
faster than the speed of light. If that principle fails, the EPR argument collapses.  
 
Bohr’s point, in essence, is that once the experimenter in the first lab chooses to do 
one of the two possible measurements in his lab, for example the one specified by the 
first (resp. second) setting in his own lab, he loses the capacity to make any prediction 
about the outcome of a measurement in the other lab associated with the second (resp. 
first) setting in that faraway lab. Thus the experimenter’s choice of what to do here 
has changed what he can know about events in the faraway region. In an essentially 
epistemological theory in which the basic reality is “our knowledge”, a reality 
associated with the faraway lab can therefore be said to depend upon a one’s choice 
made here about what one will freely choose to do here. But then the EPR claim that 
no reality “there” can depend upon what one can freely choose to do “here” fails: the 
EPR argument goes down the drain.  
 
Of course, an epistemologically based conception of reality goes against Einstein’s 
more traditional idea of reality. But this issue of the need of the basic physical theory 
to deal with non-epistemologically-based realities is the core issue in the Bohr-
Einstein dispute. Hence, Einstein cannot simply assert, without in some way begging 
the central question, that “reality” must be defined non-epistemologically. 
 
Bohr’s argumentation is basically philosophical, and about what we can know. It 
dodges the ontological issues usually associated with the phrase “physical reality”, 
which is normally contrasted to what we know, or can know. But the von Neumann-
based quantum ontology described above explains the workings of this “action at a 
distance” in “ontological“ terms. This ontology incorporates Heisenberg’s idea of 
“potentia“ as an objective tendency for a physically describable event to occur in 
association with an increment in human knowledge. This ontology that is based not on 
substances but rather on psychophysical events and mathematically described 
“objective tendencies“ for such events to occur. These tendencies are non-substantive 
because they can change abruptly whenever a new psychophysical event occurs, 
perhaps faraway. It is, basically, the acceptance of such “tendencies as objective 
realities” that differentiates this Heisenberg-type quantum ontology from substance-
based ontologies. 
 
The quantum ontological explanation of the EPR-type correlations is similar to the 
explanation of the Libet back action. In the EPR case the actualization in one region 
of some particular probing action and its outcome actualizes also the particular causal 
chain that leads up to that outcome, along with its causal off shoots, and it eliminates 
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the potentialities that would have produced the possible outcomes that were not 
actualized. But then a conscious choice of probing action made at one time and place 
can have ontological consequences in faraway regions. These faraway consequences 
are effects of causal off shoots of possible processes that are actualized by events in 
the nearby region that depend on choices freely made in the nearby region.  
 
These words are more than verbal hand waving. They are descriptions in ordinary 
words of exactly what the von Neumann mathematical representation of the evolving 
state is doing. Insofar as one accepts the idea that the reality is represented by the 
mathematics, and that our words and concepts should conform to what the 
mathematics is saying, this quantum ontology follows. It is an accurate description of 
what the quantum mathematics is saying. 
 
This ontology accords with the orthodox quantum principle that the properties P1 and 
P2, discussed above, do not exist simultaneously, and that the existence or 
nonexistence of such a property in one region can depend upon what a faraway 
experimenter does in a region that is space-like separated from the first. That is, this 
ontological conceptualization is in accord with the orthodox quantum principles, and 
it rejects, in agreement with Bohr’s answer to EPR, the strong version of the principle 
of no faster-than-light effect of any kind. Bohr’s rejection was, as already mentioned, 
essentially epistemological, and the quantum ontology translates this into a non-
classical non-substantive ontological conceptualization that does bring into the 
dynamics effects of our “free” choices of how we will act. 
 
One essential point needs to be emphasized. Von Neumann’s formulation of quantum 
theory, which provides the mathematical foundation for this ontology, was first 
published in 1932, and it is non-relativistic. A state of the universe is given for each 
“instant of time”. However, this formalism was generalized by Tomonaga (1946) and 
by Schwinger (1951) around the middle of the twentieth century to relativistic 
quantum field theory, with the quantum states now defined not on fixed-time surfaces 
but on space-like surfaces. (Every point of a fixed-time surface lies at the same time, 
whereas points on a space-like surface can lie at different times, but every point of a 
space-like surface is separated by a space-like interval from every other point on that 
surface.)  
 
In this relativistic generalization, a Process 1 event, freely chosen and acting on a 
local (nearby) portion of a space-like surface, followed by some local (nearby) 
Process 3 outcome can “instantly” affect the part of the state associated with a distant 
(faraway) portion of that space-like surface. And this “faraway” effect can depend 
upon which Process 1 event was locally chosen. Thus Einstein’s demand that such 
choices of probing actions can have no faster-than-light influence of any kind is 
violated, in accord with Bohr’s denial of the validity of that condition. However, the 
relativistic formulation does satisfy the basic requirement of the theory of relativity 
that no “signal” can be transmitted faster than light. (A signal is a message such that 
the decipherable content received is influenced by the sender.) Thus in the robust 
practical sense of communicating what one knows (here) to distant receivers, there are 
no faster-than-light actions, even though the (Tomonaga-Schwinger) quantum 
ontology does explicitly exhibit faster-than-light transfers to faraway regions of 
information that is influenced by nearby free choices.. The reason that this explicit 
faster-than-light transfer of information cannot carry a message intended by the local 
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experimenter is that the faraway effects of the nearby choice depends jointly upon the 
experimenter’s choice of the local experiment and nature’s choice of the local 
outcome in such a way that if the faraway receiver knows nothing about nature’s local 
(nearby) choice then he cannot acquire from his observations any information about 
the experimenter’s local (nearby) choice. This result is a direct consequence of the 
quantum rules.  
 
The relativistic (Tomonaga-Schwinger) von Neumann ontology satisfies the demands 
of the theory of relativity, yet explicitly exhibits the sort of faster-than light effects 
alluded to in Bohr’s answer to EPR. This rationally coherent conception of nature 
resolves the mysteries of the seeming causal anomalies by setting forth a new 
“quantum-theoretic” way of understanding nature; an understanding based not on 
substances but on psychophysical events and objective tendencies for such events to 
occur.  
 
The fact that this particular orthodox ontology involves faster-than-light effects does 
not imply that no rationally coherent theory can agree with the quantum predictions 
unless it allows transfer of information about a free choice made in one region to a 
space-like separated region. But that strong result can be proved. 
 
Certain theories entail the validity of certain statements of the form:  
 
If experiment 1 is performed and the outcome is A, then if, instead, experiment 
2 had been performed the outcome would necessarily be B. 
 
For example, according to classical physics, if we shoot a charged particle into a 
region with, say, uniform magnetic field H and it follows a semi circle of radius R 
then if we had chosen magnetic field 2H, with every other relevant thing unchanged, 
then the particle would have followed a semi-circle of radius R/2. 
 
To establish the unavoidable need in any adequate theory of nature for some sort of 
faster-than-light transfer we may consider an experiment of the kind first investigated 
by Julian Hardy. As in the EPR case, there are two space-time regions situated so that 
nothing can get from either region to the other one without traveling either faster than 
light or backward in time. In each region either one or the other of two alternative 
possible probing actions can be chosen and performed. And, for each performed 
experiment, one or the other of two alternative possible outcomes of that experiment 
will appear in the region in which that measurement is performed.  
 
Let one of the two regions be called R and the other be called L, and let the space-
time region R lie later than the space-time region L (in some specified coordinate 
frame.) The first needed assumption is this: 
 
The choices of which of two possible experiments will be performed in 
regions R and L can be treated as independent free variables.  
 
This does not mean that in the total scheme of things each of these two choices is 
undetermined until it actually occurs, but only that the choice of which experiment to 
perform can be fixed in so many alternative possible ways by systems so 
disconnected, prior to the probing action, from the system being probed, that the 
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choice of which probing action is performed can be treated as a free variable in the 
context of the analysis of this experiment. This free choice assumption is endorsed by 
Bohr, and is used by EPR.  
 
The second assumption is this: 
 
No matter which experiment is chosen and performed in the earlier region L, 
whatever outcome appears and is recorded there is independent of which 
probing action will be chosen and performed later in the faraway region R.  
 
These two assumptions, along with the assumed validity of four simple predictions of 
quantum theory for a Hardy-type experiment allow one to prove some interesting 
properties of the following statement, which I have named SR, because it is a 
statement that refers to possible happenings in region R: 
 
 
SR:: If the first of the two alternative possible probing actions in region R 
gives the first of the two possible outcomes, then the second of the two 
alternative possible probing actions in region R, if it had been performed 
instead of the first one, would necessarily have given the first possible 
outcome of that second probing action.    
 
This statement does not involve two co-existing incompatible properties: the two 
incompatible properties in R exist only under incompatible conditions in R 
 
Statement SR is logically entailed by the two assumptions described above and the 
validity of four predictions of quantum theory to be true or false according to whether 
the experimenter in region L chooses to perform in L one or the other of the two 
alternative possible actions available to him or her. (Stapp, 2004b) 
 
The conditions that logically determine whether this statement SR is true or false are 
conditions on outcomes appearing in region R under the alternative possible 
conditions that can be freely chosen in that region R. But this statement is required by 
the laws of quantum mechanics to be true or false according to which choice is freely 
made by the experimenter in region L, which is space-like separated from region R. 
This demand cannot be met by a theory that allows no information about the free 
choice made in L to get to the region R. 
 
A rationally coherent understanding of natural phenomena that allows our choices of 
which experiments we perform to be treated as free variables is logically possible, but 
any such theory that strictly enforces the principle of no faster-than-light or backward 
in time transfer of information appears to be excluded by this argument, which 
thereby removes an important barrier to the acceptance of the quantum ontology 
described above. 
 
5. Application to Libet 
 
Numerous applications of this quantum ontology to the understanding of phenomena 
in psychology, psychiatry, and neuroscience related to the connection of mind to brain 
have been described in Schwartz (2005). The central idea is to begin to fill the lacuna 
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in the causal structure associated with Process 4---the process of choosing which 
Process 1 will occur, and when it will occur---by distinguishing two kinds of Process 
4 choices: passive choices and active choices. The passive choices are entailed by 
brain activity alone: for these passive choices the Process 1 action occurs when an 
associated threshold in brain activity is reached. The expression of this physically 
described threshold remains to be specified. (cf. Stapp, 1999) Once this initial psycho-
physical event occurs, and the follow-up Process 3 outcome has produced a ‘Yes’ 
response, there can be a felt evaluation. The key assumption is that if this felt 
evaluation is sufficiently positive then there may be an active effort to attend to this 
idea, which, if sufficiently strong, will produce an almost immediate repeat of the 
original psychophysical event associated with Process 1. If the repetitions are 
sufficiently rapid then a well-known quantum effect, the quantum Zeno effect, will 
cause a long string of essential identical Process 1-Process 3 pairs to occur. This rapid 
sequence of events will, by virtue of the known quantum rules, tend to hold in place 
the associated template for action, and this will tend to cause the intended action to 
occur. Thus conscious intentions motivated by felt valuations become injected into the 
brain dynamics in a way that tends to cause consciously intended actions to occur. 
(See Stapp 2004a, Chapt. 12 for the mathematical details.) 
 
This conception of what is going on is in close accord with William James’s 
assertions (James, 1892) 
 
I have spoken as if our attention were wholly determined by neural conditions. 
I believe that the array of things we can attend to is so determined. No object 
can catch our attention except by the neural machinery. But the amount of the 
attention which an object receives after it has caught our attention is another 
question. It often takes effort to keep mind upon it. We feel that we can make 
more or less of the effort as we choose. If this feeling be not deceptive, if our 
effort be a spiritual force, and an indeterminate one, then of course it 
contributes coequally with the cerebral conditions to the result. Though it 
introduce no new idea, it will deepen and prolong the stay in consciousness of 
innumerable ideas which else would fade more quickly away. The delay thus 
gained might not be more than a second in duration---but that second may be 
critical; for in the rising and falling considerations in the mind, where two 
associated systems of them are nearly in equilibrium it is often a matter of but 
a second more or less of attention at the outset, whether one system shall gain 
force to occupy the field and develop itself and exclude the other, or be 
excluded itself by the other. When developed it may make us act, and that act 
may seal our doom. When we come to the chapter on the Will we shall see that 
the whole drama of the voluntary life hinges on the attention, slightly more or 
slightly less, which rival motor ideas may receive. ...   
 
Consent to the idea’s undivided presence, this is efforts sole achievement 
 
This understanding is in line also with James’s assertion  (James, 1911): 
 
your acquaintance with reality grows literally by buds or drops of perception. 
Intellectually and on reflection you can divide them into components, but as 
immediately given they come totally or not at all.  
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Turning to the Libet situation, we see that there is an important difference between it 
and the EPR situation. In the Libet case the initial action that initiates the agent’s later 
actions, namely the agent’s commitment to raise the finger sometime during the next 
minute, occurs before the development of the causal offshoot, and it generates the 
chain of events associated with both the creation of the causal offshoots (namely the 
creation of the records of the beginnings of the various parallel build-ups of the 
readiness potential) and also the subsequent conscious probing actions, one of which 
will eventually lead to the actualization of one of these records. This causal linkage 
breaks, in the Libet case, the control of the active conscious choice (to raise the finger 
now) upon the causal off shoot (the record). In the Libet case these active conscious 
choices act only to hold the template for action in place long enough to cause the 
finger to rise, or, by failing to so act, to effectively veto that physical action. Thus the 
active conscious choices do not influence the causal off shoots in the efficacious way 
that they do in the EPR case. They act only either to consent to the process of raising 
the finger, caused by the initial commitment to do so and nature’s subsequent “Yes”, 
or to veto this physical action by refusing to initiate the repetitions needed to produce 
the action. (See e.g, Schwartz et. al.) However, in the generation of correlations 
between two phenomena occurring different regions, the key role of an actualization 
of a potentiality having a causal off shoot is the same in both the Libet and EPR cases, 
as is the explanation of the capacity of a person’s conscious choices, unconstrained by 
any yet-known laws, to influence his physical actions. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
The quantum mechanical understanding of the mind-brain dynamical system 
explained and defended in Schwartz (2005), and further elaborated in Stapp (2005) 
and Stapp (2006), accommodates, and putatively explains, the ability of our conscious 
intentions to influence our physical behavior. This theory covers in a natural way also 
the Libet data. It reconciles Libet’s empirical findings with the capacity of our 
conscious intentions to influence our actions, without these intentions being 
themselves determined by the physically described aspects of the theory. This 
separation is achieved by exploiting a causal gap in the mathematically expressed 
laws of quantum mechanics. This gap is filled in actual scientific practice by invoking 
the conscious intentions of the human participants. This practical and intuitively felt 
role of conscious intentions is elevated, within the proposed quantum ontology, to the 
status of an ontological reality coherently and consistently integrated into quantum 
laws. 
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